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From the „Unhappy Consciousness“ to „Parasitic 
Language“
The Concept of Alienation in Hegel, Marx, and Wittgenstein
Understandably, the title of my paper promises much more than I will be able to deliver. My objec-
tive, actually, is not so much to outline historical developments in the concept of alienation since 
I believe that the notion as espoused in Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy is widely known. I aim 
rather at examining an issue which is far less obvious, namely the concept of „alienation“ in 
Wittgenstein’s thought.
The relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy on the one hand and Hegel’s and Marx’s 
philosophy on the other is part of a broader project that I have been working on recently, namely 
the Walzerian question concerning the viability of „social criticism without a critical theory“. My 
project is propelled by the following question: Is it possible to retain the emancipatory dimension 
of Marx’s philosophy if we relinquish both the idea of the universal liberation of humanity the 
ambition of devising an objective theory of capitalism? One component of my project is to attempt 
to critically deploy the concept of alienation.
Hegel’s approach to alienation as formulated in Phenomenology of Spirit constitutes a star-
ting point for my argument. The approach is anchored in Hegel’s conviction that alienation is 
not a normative category but a descriptive one. It serves solely to describe the past stages in the 
development of human consciousness. Thus in his view the concept of alienation is not critical 
in character. Marx, on the other hand, uses the concept of alienation critically, making the tran-
scendence of alienation part of the project of liberation of humanity, which is yet to be achieved. 
Marx’s weakness, however, lies in his having replaced Hegelian spirit (Geist) with the notion of 
„species-being“ (Gattungswesen), which does not allow him to fully disentangle himself from 
Hegelian metaphysics. In this paper, I will draw on Wittgenstein’s concept of therapy to argue that 
it is possible to think about alienation in a way that preserves its critical character while at the 
same time avoiding what Seyla Benhabib critically refers to as Marx’s „philosophy of the subject“. 
This, however, requires us to explore alienation as a problem pertaining to the ways in which 
language functions.
For both Hegel and Marx, the source of alienation is human action. For Hegel it is first of all 
the activity of the spirit, for, principally, whole reality is for him a form of Geist. In contrast to 
the Enlightenment thinkers, Hegel does not perceive consciousness as an a priori and immutable 
faculty, but sees it as a historical and social process rooted in human agency. The essence of this 
process lies in alienation, the doubling of consciousness and its overcoming through self-recogni-
tion or reconciliation. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel uses two words to describe alienation 
as a division in spirit, and they in fact portray alienation as a two-step process: „externalization“ 
(Entäußerung) – the immediate positing of the object – and „estrangement“ (Entfremdung) – the 
experience of this object as an alien reality. Spirit can fully actualize itself only if it becomes alie-
nated from itself and then overcomes this alienation. Practically this means that in order for a 
human being to become reconciled with himself he must first subdue nature. As Hegel states in 
the Aesthetics, „finite“ human spirit, in contrast to inﬁnite spirit (God),
is bounded and restricted by its opposite, namely nature. This restriction […] the human spirit in its existence 
[…] overcomes, and thereby raises itself to infinity, by grasping nature in thought through theoretical activity, 
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and through practical activity bringing about a harmony between nature and the spiritual Idea, reason, and the 
good.1
However, the actualization of man’s individual freedom, which is at stake in the development 
of spirit and its process through successive stages, depends on social relations and institutions 
which are necessary for man to be able to fully realize himself. According to Hegel, man can be 
fully free only in the social world. The metaphor of lord and bondsman from Phenomenology 
of Spirit implies that unambiguously as their freedom depends on mutual recognition. This is 
another significant departure from Enlightenment thought, which held social institutions to be a 
necessary evil that hinders the human pursuit and attainment of freedom.
According to Hegel, individual consciousness, from which spirit commences its develop-
ment, progresses through a series of historical stages, beginning with a state of complete unity 
in the Greek polis. Following the fall of the polis, humanity undergoes a stage of fragmentation 
and alienation. Hegel calls this early period of double consciousness „unhappy consciousness.“ 
„Unhappy consciousness“ refers to the condition in which finite individual consciousness expe-
riences a severance from its own essence, which it locates in the perfect and unchangeable world 
of divinity that exists beyond its own world. This stage begins with the advent of Christianity, 
in the period of the Roman Empire. Hegel observes that this process has positive outcomes that 
propel development of individual freedom and subjectivity. According to Hegel, self-conscious-
ness comes to complete development in the wake of Luther’s reformation and the French Revolu-
tion, when it re-unites with the natural and social world in the modern, liberal state. 
Basically speaking, Marx retains Hegelian logic of alienation. For Marx, alienation is also a 
result of man’s work on nature and he also believes that it can be overcome. Nevertheless, his appro-
ach differs significantly from Hegel’s project in many points. First of all, the concept of alienation in 
Marx’s philosophy acquires a critical character. In Hegel’s system, alienation can be said to serve a 
purely descriptive function and to have become obsolete in the present represented by Hegel’s own 
times. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel straightforwardly writes that his work is not supposed to 
provide an evaluation of the current social relationships: 
This treatise […] shall be nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently 
rational entity. As a philosophical composition, it must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to 
construct a state as it ought to be. 2
Marx, on the other hand, is convinced that the transcendence of alienation, which Hegel saw as 
already having taken place in contemporary society, is actually still a goal to be attained in the 
future provided that contemporary social relations are adequately scrutinized. In this sense, the 
concept of alienation is part of the „reform of consciousness“, as Marx puts it in his letter to Ruge, 
a reform which is to stimulate man to change his own social situation.3
Marx also differs from Hegel in the very definition of the process of alienation. For Hegel, 
alienation is a division in spirit, which first institutes objects beyond itself and then experiences 
them as alien, independent beings. Transcendence of alienation takes place together with the 
historical development of self-consciousness and consists in understanding that the world is its 
own externalization. Marx calls the Hegelian model of transcendence of alienation „actualization 
of illusion“: 
The whole history of the alienation process and the whole process of the retraction of the alienation is therefore 
nothing but the history of the production of abstract (i. e., absolute) thought – of logical, speculative thought. The 
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford 1975, 454.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge 1991, 21.
3 Karl Marx, „Exchange of Letters [letter to Ruge]“, in: Writings of the young Marx on philosophy and society, trans. 
and ed. by D. Easton and K. H. Guddat, Indianapolis 1997, 214.
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estrangement, which therefore forms the real interest of the transcendence of this alienation, is the opposition of 
in itself and for itself, of consciousness and self-consciousness, of object and subject – that is to say, it is the opposi-
tion between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself.4
In contrast to Hegel, Marx sees alienation as an experience of a real, living human being of flesh 
and blood, a worker. If labour offers the opportunity for self-realisation and is a determinant of 
humanity, both the products of labour and labour itself should be sources of satisfaction and ful-
filment for us, an expression of our humanity. However, if we are deprived of the product of labour, 
„the object which labour produces – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power 
independent of the producer.“5 Both the objects we have produced and capital as a whole, which 
depends on our labour, rule us by becoming the condition of our physical existence. The „power“ 
of our products keeps growing – the more we produce and the more we become engaged in our 
labour. This, however, induces the growth of an environment which is not only hostile to us but 
also seeks to reduce us to the role of mechanical reproducers of the system. Marx’s essential ques-
tion is: Who is this alien being that opposes man and divests him of what he himself produces, 
his labour and also his own humanity? Is it nature, is it the gods? The answer to his rhetorical 
question is, of course, no. „The alien being, to whom labour and the product of labour belongs, in 
whose service labour is done and for whose benefit the product of labour is provided, can only be 
man himself.“6 Thus the game of alienation does not play out in some otherworldly realm nor in 
the abstract world of absolute spirit. It is a game played by and among people, some of whom are 
more powerful than others, and those others, who humbly participate in the veiled manipulation 
initiated by the process of production, alienate their own activity from themselves and transfer it 
to something that is alien and does not belong to them.
The difficulty with Marx’s early phase of philosophical reflection was the nearly inadvertent 
inclusion of metaphysics in his concepts, which was actually the object of his critique of Hegel. 
The foundation of Marx’s critique of alienation and capitalism in his early philosophy was the 
notion of „species-being“, which was intended to emphasize the inter-subjective nature of subjec-
tivity and the universal character of social transformation. The notion of „the proletariat“ serves a 
similar function in Marx’s thought. Hence in his later phase, in the period of Capital, Marx strives 
to supplement his philosophical analysis with historical and economic examples exposing the 
contradictions and incoherencies that are internal to capitalism and will inevitably lead it to 
destroy itself and change into a more pro-social system as the result of an ultimate rationalisation 
of capitalism’s inherent irrationality. 
In view of this, is it then possible at all to speak of alienation without referring to the idea 
of a universal subject? I believe that it is, and that a basis for such reflection is to be found in 
Wittgenstein’s critique of language. Of course, no references to Hegel or Marx are to be found in 
Wittgenstein’s writings. However, a number of biographical accounts (by Malcolm, von Wright, 
Rees, and Monk)7 indicate that, through the mediation of Piero Sraffa, Wittgenstein did come into 
contact with Marx’s thought. References to Sraffa himself can be found in Wittgenstein’s texts. 
4 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. by M. Milligan, New York 1988, 147–148.
5 Ibid., 71.
6 Ibid., 79.
7 There are several biographical descriptions of Sraffa’s influence on Wittgenstein. One of the most influential is by 
Norman Malcolm who tells the story of Sraffa’s and Wittgenstein’s train journey. During the trip, Wittgenstein insisted 
that a proposition and what it describes must have the same „logical form“. In response, Sraffa made a „gesture, 
familiar to Neapolitans“ (Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford 2001, 58–59), and asked Witt-
genstein what its logical form is. This experience, according to Malcolm, convinced Wittgenstein that it was absurd 
to insist that „a proposition must literally be a ‚picture‘ of the reality it describes“ (Ibid., 59). Another interesting 
recollection comes from G. H. von Wright, who refers to Wittgenstein’s statement that conversations with Sraffa made 
him feel „like a tree from which all branches had been cut“ (G. H. von Wright, „A Biographical Sketch“, in: Malcolm, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 15). But in the next sentence the author adds that „later Wittgenstein did not receive any inspi-
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For instance, in the preface to Philosophical Investigations we encounter a famous formulation: 
„I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book.“8 Nevertheless, 
it is indeed difficult to discern in Wittgenstein any direct inspirations by the Hegelian-Marxian 
project with the exception of a few superficial similarities between Wittgenstein’s observations 
in Investigations and Marx’s analysis of language in German Ideology or some analogies between 
Wittgenstein’s so-called „use-theory of meaning“ and Sraffa’s theory of value in economy. 
Nonetheless I think it worthwhile to trace some analogies between Wittgenstein and Marx, 
and indirectly – through Marx – between Wittgenstein and Hegel. The analogies can be discerned 
in their understanding of philosophy and its role. I would argue that both Marx and Wittgen-
stein are engaged in a specific, practice-oriented variety of critical philosophy. Marx’s critical thin-
king would, in my view, consist not so much in enforcing a grand theory of capitalism’s political 
economy, but in revealing the illusion of capitalist labour relations in keeping with young-Marxian 
idea of critique as a „reform of consciousness.“ In the case of Wittgenstein, I would characterize 
critical thinking as a therapy consisting in the systematic exposure of the philosophical illusions 
bound up with the metaphysical use of language. 
In his Between Signs and Non-Signs, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi straightforwardly resorts to the 
notion of „linguistic alienation“ in his attempts to explain Wittgenstein’s concept of language. He 
starts from the Hegelian distinction between „consciousness“ and „thinking“, that is, roughly, from 
Hegel’s assertion that thought is consciousness grasped in language. Consciousness would then be 
a kind of non-verbal thinking, which does not yet employ language. Rossi-Landi remarks:
False thought is linguistic alienation, and that Wittgenstein dealt with false thought is obvious. But certainly he 
also dealt with false consciousness, and this in several ways. He distinguished false consciousness negatively 
from false thought and he examined mental conditions which are not verbally expressed but which can be 
perceived by studying nonverbal behaviour.9
When „something goes wrong“ on the level of consciousness, as Rossi-Landi puts it, we are 
dealing with „false consciousness“. False consciousness, in turn, the false thought bound up with 
it, and the praxis in which they are entangled, constitute a broader phenomenon of alienation. 
One should notice that when Marx speaks of false consciousness, this has nothing to do with 
the concepts of truth and falsity as understood in formal logic. Falsity is instead a kind of „disea-
se“10 that Marx endeavours to combat, and in this he somewhat resembles Freud and Nietzsche. 
Indeed, one could say that Manuscripts display the classical structure of therapy. They begin by 
diagnosing an ailment (alienation), proceed to establishing its aetiology (private property), and 
end by proposing a treatment (the abolition of private property by action).
It would not be out of place, therefore, to conclude that Wittgenstein’s philosophical project 
is a unique Marxian therapy to copes with man’s alienation, only that it takes place at the level 
of language. And the other way round, one could say that Marx’s project is a unique Wittgenstei-
nian therapy targeted at consciousness. In this sense Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a logical con-
sequence of the Marxian critique of consciousness, an advance Wittgenstein makes in proceeding 
from the critique of consciousness to the critique of thought, that is, language. Wittgenstein does 
not criticize language as such; his critique primarily concerns a specific kind of language we might 
follow Rupert Read in calling „parasitic language“.11 Such language occurs when a human being 
ration from outside“ (ibid.) in contrast to early Wittgenstein, who received support from Frege and Russel, suggesting 
that Sraffa’s influence on Wittgenstein was purely negative. 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford 1958, viii.
9 Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Between Signs and Non-Signs, Philadelphia/Amsterdam 1992, 103.
10 Ibid., 100.
11 Rupert Read, „Marx and Wittgenstein on Vampires and Parasites: A Critique of Capital and Metaphysics“, in: 
Marx and Wittgenstein: Knowledge, Morality and Politics, ed. by G. Kitching and N. Pleasants, Routledge, London/
New York 2002, 260.
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using language is not able to achieve what he would like to achieve. If language becomes alien to 
us, we are not able to express with it what we would like to express and, first of all, we are not able 
to express ourselves.
When is it that language becomes a „parasite“? Wittgenstein seems to offer a precise answer 
to this question: „The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, 
not when it is doing work.“12 Language fails to do any work when it is used in ways that violate 
its principles. Language is functional and its purposes include communicating, informing, descri-
bing – then the „engine“ works. Problems emerge when we want to talk about something that 
is incapable of becoming an element in any language game or form of life, that is, something 
that cannot „be grounded“ in practice. Then, we could say, „theory“ becomes parasitical on 
„practice“. Theory (metaphysics) does have a life of its own; it is a certain illusion which must 
derive its reality from our everyday language – similarly to the „capitalist“ who is parasitical upon 
the „worker“ without himself being real. Wittgenstein calls this situation „a metaphysical use of 
language“ and clearly defines his role as a philosopher: „What we do is to bring words back from 
their metaphysical to their everyday use.“13 Bringing language „back“ to itself means overcoming 
alienation, just as in Marx the reconciliation with oneself means perceiving the illusory alienness 
of one’s own products. 
It seems to me that we can apply this Wittgensteinian perspective in order to interpret Marx’s 
critical project in a novel and rewarding way. Its merit lies, in my opinion, in revealing an inter-
nal relationship between critique and emancipation that is at once both its goal and its reason. 
Marx realized this in the early texts in which he defined critique as a reform of consciousness. In 
this sense, Marx’s transcendence of alienation is not a journey to the promised world of an ideal 
human being, but a return to practice, the return from a consciousness that has been perverted by 
ideology back to men of flesh and blood. Marx’s point, then, would not be to construct the truth of 
man independently of context and history, but to bring man back to himself. But in fact the point 
is not „return“, either. We have always been this man, only our consciousness has gone astray 
producing „an illusion of man“. So it is not actually a return but the realization that the alienness 
of people and objects is an illusion arising from our consciousness. So if to read Marx through 
Wittgenstein entails interpreting him as proposing a kind of therapy whose aim is to abandon 
the illusions of alienation, then to read Wittgenstein through Marx is to interpret Wittgensteinian 
therapy in emancipatory terms. In this sense, the return to the everyday use of language would 
include a moment of liberation. Wittgensteinian emancipation would consist in language ceasing 
to be an alien being that hinders our self-expression. It is clear, therefore, that Hegel and Marx can 
also help us understand Wittgenstein here.
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12 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 132.
13 Ibid., § 116.
